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THE SOCIALIST ERA IN GREECE (1981–1989) 
OR THE IRRATIONAL IN POWER
1. PRELUDE
This essay in historical interpretation explores a moment in recent European history
when the political and the social converged in an atmosphere of heightened
expectations as to what a political party and its charismatic leader could achieve in
the transformation of the societal structures of a nation-state. The case for study is
Greece and the political change that occurred in 1981, when, for the ﬁrst time since
the establishment of the state (1829), a genuine transition in political government
took place, which was to test the function of democratic institutions, demonstrate
their resistance and prove their viability. The 1981 change of government in Greece
presents a ﬁne example of institutional resistance at a moment of historical crisis;
simultaneously, it shows the role of leadership in the process of establishing demo -
cratic institutions within the power structure of a European society. 
How institutions react to political interventions is one aspect of this study. The
speciﬁc historical episode also shows that even in contemporary democracies the
leadership principle can easily transform itself into a ritualistic centre of traditional
authority, in direct contrast to its own self-articulation. We suggest studying this
process, which reﬂects what might be called the ‘irrational in politics’, a process, in
this speciﬁc case, through which institutional authority was replaced by personality
appeal and political life was associated with individual idiosyncratic unpredictability.
The transformation of its ‘charismatic’ leader from a ‘sophisticated rebel’ to a ‘dino -
saur’, from a respected academic of the New Left in the United States to an autocrat
of a Balkan province, is another interesting characteristic of the same process: the
leader did not simply lose all control of his own government, but moreover adopted
a populist rhetoric in order to neutralize all forms of criticism against his personality.
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The ‘people’ (laos) became the ultimate source of power, consolidating the privileged
position of the governing party against the rest of the political system. 
The gradual transformation of an optimistic promise to a grand-scale social
disillusion undermined the reliability of all political discourses in Greece and eroded
the position of the political as social practice and moral valuation. The socialist
decade in Greece led to the complete privatization of its citizens by establishing a
traumatized and introspective de-politicization. The failure of democratic socialism
to gain reliability also destroyed all political projects for reform in the civil life of the
country. The end of the 80s showed a strong tendency towards the episodic and
symptomatic gradually replacing the promise of the political with the eﬃcacy of a
functional administrative machine (mostly dedicated to propaganda and culture
wars). In turn, this gave rise to an instrumentalisation of political discourse, which
came to be replaced by a technocratic understanding of politics as secular rituals of
nation building and social cohesion, in the post-modern era of devolution within
the process of the ongoing European federalism. The paradoxical intricacies of this
process, with Greek society on one hand trying to participate in the European
uniﬁcation process and the Greek government on the other struggling to keep the
country in its peripheral presumed autonomy, express the cultural and political
dilemmas of the country in regard to its future orientation. 
2. THE HISTORICAL SETTING
In 1981, a major shift in Greek politics took place. For the ﬁrst time after World War
II and the restoration of the Republic in 1974, there was to be a smooth handover
of power from a conservative political party to a socialist ‘movement’ with somewhat
nebulous policies about the position of the country in the international arena and
with an agenda of radical social reforms. The change itself was extremely important
and a test case for the strength of the newly established republic. Since its formation
the Greek state had suﬀered from permanent structural instability and frequent
institutional implosion. Throughout the twentieth century a number of constitutional
crises led to the imposition of colorful and ineﬀective dictatorships, regimes that led
the country to major disasters (Cyprus 1974) and polarized society, legally instituting
deep divisions along ideological lines. Furthermore, such institutional policies of
exclusion and marginalization established a hagiological tradition of persecuted
victimhood and oppression for the left-wing parties: the emotional appeal of this
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tradition became the central discourse of political debate in the country for many
decades and remains until today a powerful rhetoric for self-articulation and identity. 
The new political party that was to take over government had been established
only six years earlier in 1974 and professed to be the inheritor of all liberal traditions
of the centre-left political ideology. It had indeed functioned as the platform for the
co-existence of various political ﬁgures and ideological tendencies, spanning from
conservative centrist policies to extreme revolutionary ideas. The Pan-Hellenic
Socialist Movement (PASOK) presented itself indeed not as a party but as a social
movement which appealed to the vote of the excluded, the dis-privileged and the
persecuted. The right-wing party of New Democracy, established by Constantine
Karamanlis (1907–1998), also in 1974, proved itself totally insuﬃcient in dealing
with the looming social crisis and, most importantly, with the problems arising when
a political system, based on oppression and persecution, removed from above its
authoritarian policies. After so many decades of institutionalized persecution of
political diﬀerence, the structure of the state apparatuses and the mentality of public
servants, army oﬃcers and professional politicians needed a deeper change than
parliamentary decrees. The resistance of old established interests was also con sider -
able: between 1974 and 1981, the conservative party of New Democracy fell victim
to the conscious attempt of its leader to bring together all right-wing elements from
diverse previous generations. Consequently, instead of a radical break with extreme
right-wing elements, Karamanlis eﬀectively sheltered them and made them immune
to prosecution, creating thus an atmosphere of discontent even among his own liberal
centre-right supporters.
Karamanlis and his party aspired to becoming a liberal party in the tradition of
General De Gaulle in France; indeed Karamanlis presented himself as a stern,
apophthegmatic statesman detached from everyday politics and as the prudent leader
whose mind was dedicated to re-inventing the position of Greece within the context
of the ongoing European uniﬁcation. His famous slogan was ‘Greece belongs to the
West’, by which he meant that Greek society had to transform itself from a Balkan,
post-Ottoman, social formation into a contemporary state based on law, order and
meritocracy, on the models of western European liberal democracies and more
speciﬁcally on the French political system. 
However, the compromises he had to make with the old political establish ment
were rather serious and in eﬀect undermined the modernizing project itself. Without
himself realizing it, Karamanlis organized his party on the dichotomy of us versus
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them, in a rather naive attempt to assimilate and, as he expected, neutralize extremist
right-wing elements that remained active within the state apparatuses and more
speciﬁcally the army. Yet, his overall program was seriously undermined by his
inability to eﬀectively abolish endemic problems of the Greek state, namely political
clientelism, suspicion between citizen and state, public corruption, or indeed to solve
deep structural problems of society such as the separation of church and state. On
the economic side, the party failed to establish an open market economy regulated
and supervised by the state without relying on it as the primary investor; the state
retained its privileged position through heavy subsidizing programs funded through
high taxation, especially on the lower classes. 
In hindsight, 1974 and the restoration of the Republic could have been another
critical moment in Greek history in which changes could have been made without
major social problems. The atmosphere of hope was so contagious that any change
introduced by the government would have been considered as necessary and
inevitable by all social forces. The legalization of the Communist Party contributed
to the elevated status of Karamanlis as a statesman and opened political processes to
a considerable percentage of the population, excluded until then from mainstream
political life. For several years it seemed that the new political establishment had
gained the trust of a substantial majority and had created a consensual democracy
never before experienced in the political life of the country. 
Yet Karamanlis’ reluctant modernization was hampered by his promotion of
economic statism, through the taking over of the most important banks and proﬁtable
businesses in what was called ‘socialization’. Intense socialization led to what was later
euphemistically called ‘social-mania’ and put a sluggish state bureaucracy in charge of
the most proﬁtable sectors of the economy. Despite the high growth rate and the
intense social mobility of the years between 1975 and 1981, the political and social
atmosphere remained static because of the government’s inability to convince the
majority of citizens that modernization required changing the mentality of the state
bureaucracy, the police and the army. The social presence of such apparatuses was
rather heavy and clouded everyday life in a way which on many occasions created
generalized anxiety and social panic about a possible return to oppressive regimes.
The ongoing problems with Turkey in Cyprus and the Aegean sea exacerbated the
sense of weakness and national anemia felt by the general public. Even the important
event of joining the European Economic Union (1980), after Karamanlis’ personal
persistence and lobbying in all European capitals, was insuﬃcient to change the
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feeling that the conservative government was not doing enough to move the country
forward, strengthen society and empower citizens. Indeed citizens felt defenseless
before state bureaucracy, which acted through opaque connections and served interest
groups associated with the ruling party. Despite the continuous attempts by the
government to control corruption, it seemed that such state of aﬀairs was rather
endemic in the Greek public sector and indeed it was a natural part of the actual
political process itself.
Despite the overall optimism of the period, among the general population the
feeling of lost security was rather deep. After the fall of the dictatorship Greek
society opened to mass tourism, a movement further instigated by tales of heroism
during the anti-dictatorship campaign throughout the world. The arrival of tourists
led to uneasy comparisons for the locals and conﬁrmed the idea lurking in Greek
society about the cultural physiognomy of Greece. The historical isolation from the
rest of Europe and the sense of having been left out of major events that changed
the world became acute and rather traumatic. Free movement to western European
countries made the comparison more distressing, showing Greece lagging behind
other European countries in all but agricultural products. The promised industria -
lization was slowing down due to interventionist policies of state bureaucracy and
the rising inﬂuence of the left-wing workers’ unions, which were demanding modern
security regulations and appropriate salaries without consolidating appropriate
infrastructural changes. The conservative government’s gradual failure to make the
state eﬃcient and establish a strong economy created the certainty among people
that they were not doing enough to modernize society.
Such certainty had an immense psychological impact on the social polity of the
country. The conservative party of New Democracy was in its core membership the
inheritor of old right-wing ideologies about the privileged position of Greece as the
birth-place of Western civilization. This ideological construct of Germanic and
English origins, propagated by educational apparatuses and imposed as a self-evident
truth, was of immense psychological investment for the Greek population, who felt
that at least because of their ancestry they were indeed ‘European’. Any questioning
of the ‘European’ nature of the Greek people was immediately considered anti-Greek
and against the nation. The idea even took racial expression as a claim of direct
kinship by blood between modern and ancient Greeks, with the implicit nineteenth
century belief that blood lines have remained ‘pure’ and unchanged throughout
history. Yet the geographical position and the historical development of the country
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were indicating both a marginal and a non-European social conditioning. The
Ottoman conquest had isolated the centres of Greek culture from the intense
political debates and secularization processes that created modern European states. 
As a country Greece was a product of modern European nationalism, yet without
having confronted the problems associated with modernity or broken away from
traditional elites of power and authority. Despite the institutional modernization,
through a constitution based on civil identity, as understood in its inception in 1843,
social reality remained ecclesiocentric and followed religious practices which entailed
a strong anti-modernist agenda. The strange ideological amalgam of classical liber -
tarian Athenian democracy and oppressive Byzantine theocracy never emerged as a
paradox in the mind of state ideologues planning education curricula or politicians
making statements about history. Indeed this contradictory and self-cancelling
ideology lies at the heart of the Greek political life and to this day produces comic
and bizarre reactions and essentially neutralizes contemporary revisions of identity
and self-articulation.
The Greek government started to promote an ideological position which was to
become the main form of constructing statements of self-deﬁnition in Greek politics.
The paradox of marginality was translated into terms of ‘privileged autonomy’, as an
indication of political and cultural independence from the political centers of Europe
and, politically, from the United States. The marginal position in Europe became
somehow an ‘exceptional position’, so that Greece had to be recognized by other
Europeans as a special case, within the political processes of the advancing European
uniﬁcation, in which the country aspired to participate. Indeed the idea of a ‘special
case’ became the main argument for joining the European Economic Union during
the prolonged negotiations. Furthermore, the position of the ‘special case’ was used
in order to make Greece acceptable to the Europeans not on the basis of the eco -
nomic strength of their society but as the main external inﬂuence for strength ening
democracy. 
Essentially such an ideological argument indicated the failure of the government
to establish a modern discourse for the self-articulation of cultural production in the
country, and in political terms consolidated the double language of belonging and
not-belonging to Europe. In even more dangerous territory, Greece wanted fervently
to participate in institutions and decision-making processes but felt that it was not
bound to implement any of their decisions. The rhetoric of ‘special case’ dominated
not simply the way that the Greek government dealt with the European Economic
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Union but most importantly the way that it presented the political position of the
state to its citizens. The perception that Greece was to be accepted into the Union
not for the merits of its actual achievements but as some kind of concession to dis-
privileged late-comers caused a palpable shattering of public conﬁdence and
established counter discourses of self-representation. The feeling of being treated as
inferior led to compensation mechanisms of religious traditionalism: before and after
1981, a marked revivalist movement for the renewal of the Greek Orthodox Church
represented the position of the country in opposition to the whole of the West, on
the basis of theological diﬀerences. Ordinary citizens felt that what was not given to
them by their political leadership could easily and without any uncomfortable
questions be lavishly bestowed upon them by the traditional source of authority and
status in the country, the Church. In many occasions the Orthodox tradition was
transformed into the political discourse of an Orthodoxist ideology constructing an
emotionally powerful image of deep and unbridgeable diﬀerences with the rest of
Europe.
So during the period between 1974 and 1981 the confrontation of Greek society
with modernity took an unpredicted turn towards the gradual investment of the
secular with religious aura and authority, leaving thus incomplete the process of
establishing secular structures of civic responsibility and political discourse. In 1981
the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement won the elections with a stunning majority,
due to the general dissatisfaction of voters with the inability of the conservative
government to fulﬁll promises and deliver long term societal projects. The new party
promised not simply to end an era but to inaugurate a new period in Greek history
in which Greek citizens would be masters of their own fate: ‘Greece belongs to the
Greeks’ as opposed to the conservative slogan ‘Greece belongs to the West’. The
profound identity crisis indicated by these two slogans created an intellectual, politi -
cal and somehow existential vacuum in the country, since the concept of ‘belonging’
indicated also the need to belong, a psychical need which, in the case of Greece, was
frustrated by its historical separation from the rest of Europe and by its political
history of weak and ineﬀectual governments. The Socialist Party declared that such
frustration was over since now it could lead the social body in forms of self-recog -
nition and self-articulation which would transform itself into a ‘modern, progressive,
free’ society based on the principles of socialism.
The leader of the movement, Andreas G. Papandreou, was already a famous
economist who in his book Paternalistic Capitalism (1972) had made a strong case
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for a ‘new political economy’ which would differentiate itself from the traditional
market economy. In this book Papandreou argued that resources are allocated
‘through the market but not by the market’ (Papandreou, 1972: 6); so private corporate
managers (Galbraith’s ‘technocratic elite’) use the market for their own benefit. For
Papandreou this kind of market planning is termed ‘paternalistic capitalism’, a term
indicating ‘the autocratic, big brotherish aspect of the process’ which transforms the
state into ‘a cog in the process of private planning by the corporate establishment’
(Papandreou, 1972: 91). The book is an attack on the American establishment from
the point of view of the New Left critics of society. Despite his polemic, Papandreou
stopped short of giving a viable financial planning which would redefine the relations
between economy and the state. Probably because of his ideological origins, the
belated purpose of his economic manifesto was to criticize American imperialism in
a way that had already become common after the war in the Monthly Review gene -
ration and in the work of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy. As in the whole American
new left generation, an immense frustration dominated political criticism after the
War, when the alliance between the military-industrial complex and the American
government grew stronger. As David Renton remarked, the Monthly Review
generation ‘…despised the aggressive, colonial mindset of America’s leaders, and
looked to America’s enemies for hope’ (Renton: 2004: 122). Papandreou’s economic
model was fully expressed in Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capitalism, where the
close connection between the state and monopoly capital was analyzed in Marxian
terms. In their books the writers argued that the revolutionary initiative against
capitalism had ‘passed into the hands of the impoverished masses in the under -
developed countries’ (Baran & Sweezy, 1966: 9). In a later book, Baran sug gested that
‘the establishment of a socialist planned economy is an essential, indeed indis pen -
sable condition for the attainment of economic and social progress in underdeveloped
countries’ (Baran, 1973: 241).
Papandreou’s economic model was based on similar ideas about the under -
developed countries, and was to be tested in deed after he took oﬃce. Another
document to brieﬂy look at is Papandreou’s 1969 Benjamin F. Fairless Memorial
Lectures, published under the title Man’s Freedom (1970). In these interesting lectures,
after criticizing both American neo-imperialism and bureaucratic socialism, he stated
that: ‘The “isms” are dead. Neither capitalism nor socialism, as we have experienced
them, constitute adequate visions for the new generation. We have witnessed, the last
few decades, the death of the great ideologies that dominated man’s imagination and
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action only a while ago.’ (Papandreou, 1970: 64). He proposed a new scheme of
political action based on ‘Social Planning as a path to freedom’, and on ‘Decentralized,
democratic social planning’ which would distinguish between ‘political authority and
the planning bureau’. He concluded: ‘Man’s freedom requires us to overcome the
irrational interplay of social forces, to subject them to our conscious control. Thus, it
requires social rather than private planning. But if this planning is to serve the
interests, the values of the people at large, rather than those of a self-appointed elite,
it must be democratic and decentralized’ (Papandreou, 1970: 71).
Papandreou’s plan for the reconstruction of the economy through social control
seemed very promising and extremely appealing. In the same lectures Papandreou
stressed the peculiar position of Greece: ‘For Greece, a country that is European
while partaking of the characteristics of the Third World, is a new type of experiment
in intervention. For in the case of Greece, methods have been employed which are
truly novel for the European continent. Greece has become the ﬁrst Banana Republic
on the European Continent’ (Papandreou, 1970: 56). Following Papandreou’s
suggestion, the country could be the best experimental ﬁeld for democratic decen -
tralization and self-government that would place economic planning under social
control and free the ‘people’ from capitalist exploitation. 
When Papandreou in 1981 was elected a domestic reform program called ‘Con -
tract with the People ’ was initiated. Socialization programs were introduced and
certain decentralization policies transferred power to municipalities. The Greek
Government Program as presented by Papandreou himself envisaged redistribution
of wealth, social security for every citizen, educational reforms and tax relief for
farmers. The Keynesian policy of raising salaries with the intention of mobilizing
market economy was also introduced. By 1985, however, the annual inﬂation rate had
again risen to 25%, which led to the constant devaluation of the currency and the
immense growth of the deﬁcit, to 10% of gross national product by 1986 and to 20%
by the end of 1989. 
Despite the major re-distribution of income, based mainly on re-directing funds,
the investment rate decreased dramatically, while gradually a deep distrust towards
Papandreou’s personal style of government became dominant. Furthermore, against
his anti-American rhetoric, ties with US, even under the hostile presidency of Ronald
Reagan, were strengthened and the American military presence in Greece was
increased. Papandreou’s other external enemy, Turkey, was used to fan nationalist
feelings of immense general appeal, despite the meager or rather negative outcomes
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of his policies. In 1988, after a crisis in the Aegean and a badly prepared meeting
with the Prime Minister of Turkey Turgut Ozal, Papandreou made the famous
statement at the Parliament, which he had visited only twice since 1984: ‘Mea Culpa,’
admitting to his own errors. Yet the policy of a rhetorically belligerent confrontation
with Turkey continued till the end of the regime without any real changes in the
actual bilateral relations.
However, beyond all these policies, which can be attributed to circumstantial and
symptomatic factors of international politics, the greatest disappointment was on
the domestic front. The charismatic leader who promised decentralization, self-
government and open democracy soon transformed himself into a semi-mystical
source of authority and power, above all criticism, changing ministers and cabinets
for strategic reasons before major crises or policy announcements. Kostas Mardas’
personal account from within the socialist party reads like a fascinating novel
(Mardas, 1995), depicting the transformation of a democratic leader into a power-
obsessed head of a ruling party who consciously made his own personality the central
institution of Greek civic culture. Indeed the ‘transposition’ of his personality to the
level of the ultimate institutional authority within his party, as happened with Nasser
in Egypt, had a wide range of consequences for the political behavior of the citizens
and the decision-making process of the administration. 
The gradual disappearance of the citizen as an active political subject in the
country became the dominant characteristic of Greek political life especially after
1985. Papandreou’s ‘incredible capacity to claim one thing while doing another’
(Spourdalakis, 1988:258) created an immense deﬁcit in the perception of the political
in Greece; unable to change the state into a one-party system, he created a feeling
of loss within the political system, which squandered all structural achievements after
1975. Francis Fukuyama stated that the fall of the dictatorships in ‘Greece, Spain and
Portugal’ meant the beginning of the end for totalitarian states in Europe (Fukuyama,
2004:5). After the initial joy of 1981, the Socialist Party and its leader transformed
themselves into an extremely traditional political formation with its authority based
on clientelism and populism, annulling thus the ‘new humanism’ or the ‘new political
economy’ that Papandreou had advocated in his writings before coming to power. 
In one of his most notorious statements, which has become a political proverb in
the vocabulary of the country, Papandreou declared that he had the right to negate
himself; the fact of the matter is that he was doing it so fast at the end that there was
nothing at all to be negated. PASOK rule ended in the immense existential void
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that made all political projects irrelevant, and for better or worse made society
autonomous from the political processes reﬂecting its structures. The outcome of
eight years in government by the socialist part was the construction of the dissociated
citizen, destroying thus the organic structure of the movement for political democ -
racy and liberation that had guided left wing political parties after the Greek Civil
War.
3. SOCIAL PSYCHODYNAMICS BETWEEN THE
LEADER AND THE MOVEMENT
Unfortunately we do not have a substantial body of studies on the actual socio-
political changes that took place in Greece under the Socialist Party; but it must be
admitted that it was one of most fertile periods for collective fantasies, imaginary
constructions and personal illusions. Indeed Papandreou’s virile appeal generated
collective fantasies and almost paranoid delusions of omnipotence, in contrast to the
reality of economic collapse, social disunity and military weakness. The more
impotent the government was to solve problems, all the more strongly the fantasy
of Greece as an ‘intellectual superpower ’ was gaining currency among the population.
The leader himself became the ‘attributional interface’ linking political symbols as
public rituals with private symbolic signiﬁcations. Participation in mass rallies and
in political demonstrations became an event of self-deﬁnition and empowerment,
while for the younger generation, who had just been given the right to vote at
eighteen, mass pre-election rallies became rites of passage into adulthood and
maturity. 
The charismatic leader with his powerful rhetoric ‘glued’ the chaotic reality
together, making his own personality an autonomous psychical symbol of
intersection between the private and the public, the imaginary and the real, the
symbolic and the personal. The leader was one of the few politicians known by their
ﬁrst name (‘Andreas’s Greece’) as opposed to the ‘Generation Mitterrand’ in France
or ‘Reagan’s America’ in the US. The personalization of the political realm and its
symbols became so powerful psychologically that ‘Andreas’ became synonymous with
the party and the socialist tradition. The name of the leader became a ‘thick synec -
doche’ of positive transference and thus of political heteronomy. The contradiction
between the slogan of political autonomy and the practice of civic heteronomy never
became an issue for party ideologues like Costas Laliotis, or even for Papandreou
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himself. However, the contradiction became more visible as Papandreou’s personality
started exhibiting symptoms of self-aggrandizement and narcissistic immunity, signs
of troubled childhood under narcissistic parents and indications of the absence of
strong attachments during his formative years. (His semi-autobiographical work
Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front [Penguin Books 1973] provides abundant
material for a solid assessment of his personality.) But these symptoms became
political events after a series of changes took place in the country and took on their
collective signiﬁcance.
Beyond any doubt things changed in the country, and life, or the felt culture in
the country, took a diﬀerent turn. First, by 1989 there was a deep demographic
change due to the repatriation of political refugees from Eastern European countries.
The change gave a distinct ‘oriental’ character to forms of social expression (music,
popular culture, cinema, etc). The migrants from Eastern Europe created a structural
problem of social adjustment which the government tackled eﬃciently and with
considerable sensitivity. However, the trauma of displacement found its expression
in the rise of introspective cinema, eminently in Theo Angelopoulos’ Voyage to Cythera
(1984), which set the tone for a generalized melancholia, culminating at the end of
the decade with Angelopoulos’ Landscape in the Mist (1988), in which the image of
an absent, lost and silent ‘father’ embodies the lack of meaning and the death of all
codes of signiﬁcation. 
Whereas socialism had promised an era of social optimism and cultural
emancipation from intellectual and political inferiority, the reality was less than
liberating: it brought to the fore social phobias and latent existential ambiguities
that neutralized the creative imaginary in the country. Cultural reﬂection reverted to
the cult of traditionalist ‘Greekness’ as articulated by the conservative thinkers of
the 30s, while at the same time it promoted a religious revivalism that undermined
the secular orientation of the previous government. In the period after 1985, despite
the heavy funding of culture by the arts minister Melina Mercouri, no works of
enduring quality were produced. On the contrary, popular culture based on banal or
even vulgar social types (Harpoon ‘Kamaki’) dominated cinematic production, which
after the introduction of video restricted itself to low budget movies depicting social
caricatures or to the production of cheap porn movies for north European markets.
Despite its implicit endorsement of ‘high culture’ the socialist decade was
marked by the rise of populist, commercial and derivative cultural representations.
Further more, despite the early attempts to produce TV serials of high standards,
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after 1985 the whole production line on state-controlled television stations was
taken over by American serials, which set the pace for the productions of the next
decade. The social types presented in these serials, based on American programs
like Dallas, were depicting masculinity in crisis, or fatal women in search of
meaningful life. The popular culture expressed more vividly the structural distrust
of public personality, illustrating an amorphous introspective imagination in search
of novel formal representations. The appearance of AIDS presented a new fear
that further desta bilized especially the machismo culture as represented by the
strong virile and beyond-criticism leader. Around the end of the decade the
charisma of the leader caused a crisis of masculine representation which led for
the first time to the depiction of real homosexual characters. Indeed the crisis in
masculine representa tions was so deep that the most masculine character in power
seemed to be the famous actress Melina Mercouri, because of her un-political
integrity. The other characters around Papandreou were reduced to weak and
impotent individuals obedient to the demands of his higher authority and became
symbols of servility. Cartoons of the period depict Papandreou as a Byzantine
monarch surrounded by a prostrating court. In contrast, the cartoonist Giorgos
Ioannou presented a series of social commentaries in cartoon under the title ‘The
Miracle’; Greek society was always on the verge of an imminent catastrophe but
something always happened at the last minute and it was saved. The salvation didn’t
always take place; yet the atmosphere of an imminent end was palpable by 1988,
when democratic processes were reduced to spectacles of self-promotion and to
some degree of self-exposure. 
When in 1989 PASOK lost power the end of an era of heightened expectations
became a cynical reality. And when it returned to power in 1993 and 1996 it was
obvious that even under Papandreou, Papandreou’s legacy was silently pushed
aside. When in 1996 Costas Simitis assumed power from the ailing and tragic
figure of Papandreou, the party itself struggled to re-invent its character and more
urgently to forget the Papandreou years, under the banner of ‘modernization’. It
was indeed an act of patricide which partially liberated the dynamic of the party
and gave a new post-ideological and post-charismatic leadership orientation to
the political debate. In the new reality Papandreou himself looked like a historical
accident which could be remembered for both the surprise it caused and the loss
it entailed.
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4. THE LEGACY OF SOCIALIST POPULISM
The Papandreou era undermined the validity of most existing political discourses in
the country: it simply dismantled the vocabulary of politics and created a formulaic
language of repetitive simpliﬁcations and platitudes. This was not because a left-
wing party was unable to act responsibly from its new position of being in power and
create a contemporary civil identity. The main problem with the Greek socialist party
was that they felt as if they were still in opposition when they were in government.
Although they were taking decisions on crucial issues, they always acted as a
persecuted political fringe group. In reality, they themselves were persecuting their
opponents through masterful media wars, especially while they had control of the
mass media. After the control was lost and communication of ideas and public
criticism became inevitable, the party collapsed and the leader lost his charismatic
appeal. 
After the ‘people’ were exposed to other sources of information, Papandreou’s
simplistic populism lost its appeal and became unreliable and spurious, even for his
own voters who started disbelieving and questioning the policies and the intentions
of the government. After that point, his very presence created an immense gap in the
political conscience of the country since his rhetoric neutralized the validity of
political action. During his last term in oﬃce, Papandreou’s political discourse de-
politicized all social projects and transformed them into a confusing and perplexing
theory of ‘exceptional’ characteristics of impenetrable narcissism associated with his
personality. He felt so empowered that during the campaign of 1989 without any
hesitation he declared: ‘there are no institutions; the only existing institution is the
people’ – a statement reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher’s notorious dictum: ‘there is
no such thing as society’. The rhetoric of his last term in government destroyed all
political forms of thinking and regressed the discourse of power to a pre-political
mythologisation of the leader cultus. His very presence was living proof of the death
of the political in Greece.
Indeed what was tried in Greece during the 80s was not simply a socialist expe -
riment or a new form of administration – things that never took place anyway. The
main principle that was tested was the leadership principle, the way that a charis -
matic ﬁgure could govern and give its speciﬁc orientation to social projects within
the country. Furthermore how the leadership principle could easily degenerate into
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an irrational use of power without thinking about its social and general consequences.
The same was tested in 1910 in Greek history when the charismatic Prime Minister
Eletheurios Venizelos (1864–1936) had the opportunity to radically change the
constitution, introduce a functional parliamentary democracy and establish the state
of the law in a political system tormented by corruption and disunity. But Venizelos
opted for a compromise with monarchy and the old land aristocracy, creating thus a
prolonged crisis of institutional authority. The crisis was expressed in the tragic
conﬂict between the Parliament and the Crown which led to the Division of 1916–
17 and ﬁnally to the Asia Minor Catastrophe in 1922. 
The same failure was repeated on a minor scale by Papandreou’s socialist experi -
ment. The government had the golden opportunity to change the endemic culture
of corruption, political clientelism and nepotism that was the hallmark of the
previous right-wing parties. In 1982 and 1983, when major administrative reforms
were attempted, all attempts to establish meritocracy were abandoned due to internal
party pressures. All projects for social and economic reforms were gradually trans -
formed into exercises on paper and the ‘socialist’ ideas of decentra lization and
self-government were transformed into a bureaucratic managerial style of operating,
reﬂecting the extremely traditional, or even conservative, forces that had found refuge
in the socialist party.
At the same time, Papandreou invested his power with a religious aura, avoiding
public criticism, speechifying endlessly in a Castro-like style in front of his own
people while reinforcing the most insidious values of patriarchal society and investing
his authority with phallic power and sexual prowess. Yet while he was doing so, he
was losing the moral legitimacy of socialism and the whole project of modernizing
politics. The de-moralization of political life had nothing to do with the scandals of
his personal life (extra-marital aﬀairs etc). On the contrary such episodes humanized
power, in a way similar to François Mitterrand in France or Olof Palme in Sweden,
establishing a new relationship with a Greek people not overly obsessed by moral
questions of guilt and retribution. Yet the whole issue of his personal life was
presented especially by his media advisers in terms of Mediterranean machismo,
stressing his manliness and his fecundity as a leader. Anthropologically, the fact that
an ageing prime minister had a young mistress was extremely important for the
symbolic fertility of the country. It expressed the libidinisation of the social sphere
by sexualizing the political discourse and presenting a novel image of a leader who
had regained his masculine qualities. 
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Robert D. Kaplan, an eye-witness to the gradual transformation of the PASOK
government and Papandreou himself, observed that: ‘Unlike the other foreign-
educated intellectuals in PASOK, Papandreou was at home in their smoke-ﬁlled
coﬀee houses and was devious to the core. Papandreou had a virile and demagogic
speaking style, which the urban poor and the inhabitants of the Greek countryside
responded to. His was a political style reminiscent of Argentina’s Juan Peron, or
Israel’s Menachem Begin: another Western-educated, dynamic orator whose base of
support was situated among the poorest and most Oriental part of the population,
which he has prodded into ascendancy over the European half. Thus the Romios,
not the Hellenes, surrounded Papandreou, formed its inner circle and ran PASOK
for him’ (Kaplan, 1993: 265-66).
Behind Kaplan’s observation one can easily detect the problem of the confronta -
tion with modernity in countries which didn’t participate in the economic and social
changes that shaped Western Europe. In its ‘deep structure’ Greek society remained
a post-Ottoman formation, which articulated its political discourse in quasi-religious
language, marked by the demoralizing inability of its leaders to establish a secular
understanding of social practices, civil rituals and political values. Papandreou revived
the Byzantine-Ottoman legacy of an authority that is worshipped and venerated
but never criticized or questioned. Indeed, despite the fact that Papandreou intro -
duced civil marriage, his wedding to his mistress took place in church; and when in
1989 an interim government was formed after an agreement between the Conser -
vatives and the two main parties of the Left Papandreou described the collaboration
as ‘unholy and unprincipled’ (Clive, 1990: 117). 
His political idiom was more than populist: it was anti-secular and pseudo-
religious, characterizing every criticism of his personality as something blasphemous
and irreverent. Furthermore, a rhetorical study of his speeches during the election
campaigns of 1981, 1985 and 1988/9 would indicate that the main tenor of his
arguments was focused around the model of the black night of Right rule making
people suﬀer on the way to the Calvary (Passion Week in the Orthodox ecclesiastical
calendar) and the Resurrection (anastasis) of the people under the socialist govern -
ment. The Manichean dualism of his political rhetoric encapsulated the vision of
politics he and his party expressed: anti-modernist and anti-secular, based on irrecon -
cilable polar opposites in a universe populated by demonic enemies and invisible
conspiracies. 
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Within the institutional framework of modern democracy Papandreou made an
impossible error of judgment: he identiﬁed his public oﬃce with himself. Indeed, in
a inverted way he tried to introduce the presidential powers of the American political
system for the prime minister’s oﬃce, without instituting any of the sub-systems of
checks and balances that gave the American presidency both personal character and
collective endorsement. In the Constitutional Reform of 1986 the prime minister
became the main source of power, divesting the presidency of all its powers and
instituting partisan politics as the dominant form of political conduct in the country.
From one point of view, this could be seen as the revenge of the much-despised
American political system against its own renegade oﬀspring.
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